Private mechanisms of global environmental governance: The international Monsanto tribunal case by Cortellini, Isabel
  
LEIDEN UNIVERSITY 
INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
PRIVATE MECHANISMS OF GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
The International Monsanto Tribunal case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MSc Political Science - Thesis Seminar Student: Isabel Cortellini 
Critical Approaches in International Relations Student number: S1756239 
Instructor: Dr. Francesco Ragazzi e-mail: i.cortellini@umail.leidenuniv.nl 
Second Reader: Dr. Frits Meijerink Submission date: June 6, 2016. 
 
  
 
 Page 1 of 25 
PRIVATE MECHANISMS OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
The International Monsanto Tribunal case 
 
 
Isabel Cortellini 
Leiden University 
Institute of Political Science 
 
Abstract 
This article investigates the International Monsanto Tribunal campaign as a process of 
institutionalizing private governance steering mechanism. Following an overview of the 
state-of-the-art discussion in global environmental governance, the paper develops the 
concepts of transnational network theory. Subsequently, it presents the concepts and 
framework that guide the empirical analysis. The case study is introduced, describing what 
are activities and initiatives carried out, the actors involved, and the expected impact on 
global environmental governance. I explore the case through the theoretical framework, 
assessing potential problem-solving capacities and attributes of legitimacy of the actors. It 
is argued that the International Monsanto Tribunal`s actors can engage in complex problem 
solving and it has the attributes that improve governance legitimacy. Moreover, the set of 
strategies are addressed separately, where I identify the different tactics of persuasion, 
socialization and pressure employed by non-state actors in order to steer global policy-
making. Then, I draw preliminary conclusions on the prospect of effectiveness of the 
campaign. Following this, the conclusions take place, reinforcing the argument that the 
Tribunal is a mechanism of global environmental governance as defined by transnational 
network theory. Lastly, I draw some lessons for future avenues of empirical research of the 
effectiveness of this campaign and make a case for  normative research in an 
interdisciplinary context. 
 
Introduction 
On the coming October an unprecedented tribunal will be held: civil society 
groups established a court to assess and evaluate alleged damages caused by Monsanto, 
a transnational company. This tribunal reflects one of the many facets of global 
environmental governance, which has increasingly become more complex over the 
years. Currently, it is a multifaceted regime, where governance mechanisms take on a 
variety of forms beyond multilateral agreements (Andonova et al 2009:52) and beyond 
state actors. Authority and responsibility are diffused across scales, social groups, 
sectors, states and generations through a regime complex, which has not been 
comprehensively designed but rather has emerged as a result of single decisions. 
Transnationals networks are shaping politics that more than ever.  
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Environmental governance has become more complex over the years as the 
numbers of organizations, rules and institutions increase (Keohane and Victor 2011:12; 
Abbott 2012:571). As civil society takes up space in international politics, new 
governance mechanisms emerge, constituting a new model of governance that is not 
comprehensively designed. Where intergovernmental initiatives fail to respond 
effectively to an issue, new mechanisms and forms of governance by non-state actors 
(NSAs) fill the gap created (Bulkeley et al. 2009:58). In this sense, Spiro argues that “to 
the extent that states have a self-interest in minimizing the constraints of international 
environmental law, as well as to the extent that state power is diminishing, this 
possibility of extra institutional governance is surely a good thing” (1998:809). 
Yet, how this mechanisms emerge and are institutionalized? From framing 
issues and influencing agenda to changing and monitoring policy and behavior of other 
international actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998:25), non-state actors (NSAs) are far from 
being just spectators waiting for (inter)governmental institutions to rule across borders. 
NSAs carry out collective and coordinated initiatives in order to broaden the 
participation on environmental governance decision-making processes. Keck and 
Sikkink's book (1998; 1999) draws a model of world politics in which NSAs define new 
global issues, win commitments from other policy actors and monitor the 
implementation of those commitments and interact with transnational actors through 
networks. 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the process of institutionalization of 
a private mechanism of global environmental governance, by investigating the 
campaign of the International Monsanto Tribunal. My sources consist on open-question 
interviews with six members of the organizing committee involved in the Tribunal and 
on press releases, media coverage and international relations literature. The paper 
begins with an overview of the literature and current debates on global environmental 
governance. After this, it sets out the conceptual and theoretical framework that guided 
the empirical analysis. Subsequently, the case study is presented and analyzed. Finally, 
in the conclusions, I briefly discuss my findings and indicate avenues for future 
empirical and normative researched. 
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Literature Review 
Global environmental governance is a vast field of inquiry that includes 
scholars from varied disciplines, hindering the delineation of the scope and limits of the 
field in one single discipline. This paper focuses on the core of the international 
relations (IR) literature on transnational governance (Wapner 1995; Keck and Sikkink 
1998, Dauvergne 2012:4; Khagram et al. 2002). Early environmental transnational 
relations scholarship replaced a state-centric approach, not only allowing scholars to 
analyze other actors, specially civil society, but also to look beyond power and material 
interests, accounting for ideas, knowledge, and discourse (Zürn 1998). After this shift, 
three main debates emerged in the discussion about environmental politics: (a) regime 
theory; (b) liberalism; and (c) transnationalism.  
Climate change regime theory (RT) focuses mainly on the reasons and 
conditions under which international environmental regimes emerge. RT scholarship 
focuses on mapping the overarching structure of decentralized environmental regulation 
(Biermann et al 2009; Andonova et al 2009:52; Keohane 2011; Abbott 2012, 2014). 
Environmental scholars borrow the definition of regime, which is also employed in this 
paper, from mainstream IR, which defines it as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983:In Keck and Sikkink 
1998:4). It is true that RT recognizes the relevance of international organizations and 
non-state actors (NSAs) in making and applying rules, yet it argues that rational states 
still play the main role in international environmental politics. Keohane and Victor 
explain that states establish different environmental regimes, or institutions, to further 
their interests to the extent that “such institutions help states achieve their objectives 
through reducing contracting costs, providing focal points, enhancing information and 
therefore credibility, monitoring compliance, and assisting in sanctioning deviant 
behavior” (2011:8). Thus, states engage in cooperation when collective action is more 
beneficial than unilateral action and, ultimately, states decide whether to create a 
regulatory regime meaning NSAs have no authority to this effect. 
Furthermore, RT explains the process of regime formation, from the 
conditions to the emergence of conducive elements of content and negotiations. 
However, RT scholars fail to explain the role of NSAs in the creation of norms and their 
contribution to regime. In their view, regime is effective only if it changes the incentive 
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structure of the key states, so that compliance to environmental regime is conditioned to 
a rational calculation of costs and benefits by the states and NSAs only influence in the 
calculus of state interests (Keohane and Victor 2011:8). By doing so, regime theorists 
reduce NSAs to their technical accomplishments, to the detriment of their political 
character and the political work they do (Barnett and Sikkink 2011:71), and maintain a 
state-centric perspective after all. 
The second environmental governance strain, liberalism, has moved from 
focusing on the state as a unitary rational actor that is motivated largely by material 
interests (Abbott and Snidal 2000:425) to presenting a shared multi-causal model of 
instrumental state behavior. Liberalists assume state preferences derive from domestic 
and transnational social pressures (Moravcsik 2009). Liberalism not only recognizes the 
influence of transnational actors on domestic constituencies, but also their influence in 
shaping state behavior by determining its national preferences. In this vein, domestic 
politics and international relations are inextricably entangled, constituting a two-level 
game (Putnam 1988). By focusing on variation in preferences, instead of capabilities or 
information, liberalism challenges realism and regime theory respectively (Moravcsik 
2009:715). Self-interested actors are constrained by legitimate social compromises – 
that is, regulatory environmental issues limit self-interested actors. Environmental 
liberalism accounts for NSAs’ activities, both on the national and the international level, 
as they make additional contributions by providing regulatory inputs in the agenda-
setting process. 
Despite the fact that the environmental liberal strain recognizes that NSAs 
shape the international policy-making process, the theory fails to explain how this 
happens. In this sense, both climate change regime theory and environmental liberalism 
scholars limit themselves to ask if and why NSAs influence international outcomes 
according to the variation in the substantive content of the issues and hegemonic orders 
(Moravcsik 2009:722). By overlooking NSAs’ strategies, liberalists “fail to explain why 
some environmental issues (for example, the climate) made it to the top of the 
international agenda, while others (for example, the degradation of agricultural land) 
barely made it at all” (Zürn 1998:623). Another shortcoming of this strain is in 
accounting for compliance. The liberal explanation for compliance ultimately accounts 
only for states, as “it might be that any kind of international commitment made by a 
liberal state—environmental or otherwise—is more deeply ‘internalized’ than the same 
 Page 5 of 25 
kind of commitment made by another kind of state” (Danish 2008:216). Thus, NSAs 
would only affect compliance indirectly, through participation in the process of 
internalizing an international environmental commitment. State-related factors are more 
determining in this regard. 
The third and last strain is environmental transnationalism. 
Transnationalism refers to the body of literature that assumes the international system is 
a global society rather than being a state of anarchy. It also considers international 
environmental politics more than inter-state phenomena, encapsulating all forces and 
constraints on state and corporate political activities, either formal or informal 
(Dauvergne 2012:9). This strain implies a different dynamic and character, one that 
“entails the emergence of novel forms of rule across borders, where borders have 
become porous to such transnational schemes” (Bulkeley et al. 2009:58). This 
scholarship examines all types of political pressures exerted on and by international 
actors, especially NSAs’ crosscutting influence on both domestic and international 
levels. This paper builds on this approach, for it proposes a multi-level analysis of both 
structural and actors-related factors to assess how NSAs influence global environmental 
governance. While the former considers the context of an increasingly institutionalized 
arena of environmental governance (Goldstein et al. 2001; Abbott et al. 2001; Pattberg 
and Stripple 2007), the latter relates to the actors themselves and the governance 
mechanisms. 
Theory and concepts 
This paper joins the growing literature on transnational governance that 
replaces “the traditional dichotomous concepts of global governance organized 
hierarchically or anarchically with a network model of decentralized global governance” 
(Haas 2004:1) and concentrates on the increase in NSAs, new arenas for politics and 
action, different and often non-synchronized discussion fora, the blurring of borders and 
the muddying of distinction between domestic and global levels of politics (Khagram et. 
al 2002:4; Pattberg and Stripple 2007:2). It is necessary to understand that the notion of 
environmental governance encompasses all decision-making channels through which 
policies are pursued, goals are framed and directives issued (Rosenau 1995:179). 
Transnationalism theory draws on the constructivist assumption that actors are 
motivated by moral concerns and international regimes arise from shared norms and 
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values. So it is “made up not only of states engaged in self-help or even rule-governed 
behavior, but of dense webs of interactions and interrelations among citizens of 
different states which both reflect and help sustain shared values, beliefs and projects” 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998:213).  
NSAs organize and work through these webs, or networks, to influence 
environmental governance. While state actors are organized around hierarchies (Barnett 
and Sikkink 2011:759), networks are “forms of organization characterized by voluntary, 
reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:8). There is a fluid relation among the members, with little distinction between 
high and low politics. Networks are comprised mainly of NSAs (NGOs, domestic 
constituencies and political groups, transnational corporations, individuals), but states, 
substate actors (i.e. municipalities, trade unions) and international organizations can 
also participate. The interests, preferences of actors and cost distributions vary 
depending on the nature of the issue, as do transnational networks’ members and their 
core values and discourses that unite them (Khagram et al. 2002). Price explains: “put 
theoretically, actors seek to change not just the interests and identities (and thus 
practices) of actors but also the environments within which those actors operate—that 
is, the structures of power and meaning.” (Price 2003:583). 
Networks purposefully “form social institutions to address the problem of 
climate change without being forced, persuaded or funded by states and other public 
agencies” (Pattberg and Stripple 2007:6). To put it another way, actors act collectively 
towards changing environmental regimes and institutionalizing policy-coordination 
mechanisms. Networks act through these mechanisms, which are more dynamic (and 
thus more efficient, as I argue below) in comparison to state politics’ bureaucratic and 
hierarchical properties, for they multiply the channels of access to global environmental 
governance. Rosenau describes them using the term steering mechanisms, for it stresses 
the nature of governance without government, as “a form of recurrent behavior that 
systematically links the efforts of controllers to the compliance of controlees through 
either formal or informal channels” (1995:15).  
Therefore, environmental transnationalism helps scholars to identify these 
networks, analyze why and how they operate, analyze their steering mechanisms, and 
identify when they are effective in shaping global environmental governance. Networks 
are reconceptualizing environmental global governance and influencing preferences and 
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identities of international actors, transforming the terms and nature of the policies 
debates. The evaluation of these mechanisms is done in terms of the advocacy networks 
capacity to increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance (Bulkeley et 
al. 2009). 
Frameworks 
First, to increase effectiveness, networks develop problem-solving capacity 
(Börzel and Risse 2002:2). Bulkeley et al. explain that “[t]o the extent that transnational 
governance is regarded as driven by the interests of particular actors, effectiveness 
becomes associated with the ability to meet these objectives while also contributing to 
the public good” (2009:47). Networks problematize an issue and propose a solution to 
it, either in response to a lack of existing global policy or by deeming existing policy 
inappropriate. Therefore, effective mechanism offer desirable forms of flexibility and 
responsiveness to a policy objective, especially in view of being based as they are on 
persuasion through information sharing and learning (Haas 2004; Ruggie 2002; 
Bulkeley et al. 2009:43). Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood (1998:389) explain: 
“Any investigation of the role of argument and persuasion on the basis of shared norms 
must sooner or later take account of the fact that discursive practices are situated or 
embedded in deeper normative structures, such as states, sovereignty and anarchy, that 
constitute the organizing principles of the international system. One of the lasting, and 
still-pertinent, questions for international studies concerns when and how 
transformation occurs in the fundamental social structures of international affairs.” 
Most transnational governance mechanisms are persuasive, as opposed to 
coercive. Keck and Sikkink, explaining how this process of persuasion occurs, argue 
that “an effective frame [problematization] must show that a given state of affairs is 
neither natural or accidental, identify the responsible party or parties, and propose 
credible solutions. This requires clear, powerful messages that appeal to shared 
principles, and which often have more impact on state policy than the advice of 
technical experts” (1999:96). However, they further explain that the term persuasion is 
insufficiently precise to be of much theoretical use to define what networks do, so they 
present a typology of tactics employed by networks. I enter into more detail on this 
specific framework on the sext subsection. What matters in this context is that 
effectiveness is related to the capacity of a network to change other actors’ behavior 
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(state, governments, international organizations or transnational corporations) (Keck 
and Sikkink 1999:97). 
The second lens through which networks should be evaluated is their 
capacity to improve the legitimacy of global governance. It is the moral authority that 
enables NSAs to affect global governance. Reviewing transnational literature and 
empirical cases, Price argues that “decision makers and/or citizens often believe that 
activists are not only (objectively) right in the sense of providing accurate information 
but also morally right in the purposes for which such knowledge is harnessed” 
(2003:589). In this fashion, networks’ moral authority stems from its expertise and 
knowledge (as with Peter Haas’s epistemic communities) about problem solving around 
a highly valued issue, such as human rights and climate change. Legitimacy not only 
“requires that those who are affected by collectively binding decisions should have a 
say in the decision-making process” (input legitimacy), but also “refers to the 
effectiveness of policies in the sense that they serve the common good and conform to 
criteria of distributive justice” (output legitimacy) (Börzel and Risse 2002:13). 
Transnational civil society is known to represent an international common good, often 
neglected by narrow-minded states and the for-profit actors. Wapner (1995), for 
instance, argues that networks increase the democratic nature and the accountability of 
international institutions in international governance. Therefore, legitimacy involves a 
bottom-top logic towards policy change, in which “in order to acquire the legitimacy 
and support [networks] need to endure, successful mechanisms of governance are more 
likely to evolve out of bottom-up than top-down processes” (Rosenau 1995:17). 
Khagram et al. (2002:313) provide four networks’ attributes that help to 
identify the moral authority that improves global governance legitimacy. Firstly, 
representativeness – if networks are to claim values in the name of others, they should 
cover the will of others, whether weak, repressed or underrepresented. While Khagram 
et al. consider this attribute the most complicated link for diminishing authority, I argue 
further that representativeness is the democratic credentials of networks. Secondly, 
reliability relates to the quality of the information and knowledge provided by the 
network. Thirdly, networks impartiality, whereby networks must be perceived as not 
self-interested, but rather working for a “greater good”, that is, for the achievement of a 
shared value. Lastly, accountability and transparency refers to the network being 
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accountable itself, in case they deviate from their purpose, they will suffer consequences 
and they should be as transparent as possible about their processes for achieving goals. 
Transnationalism as proposed by Keck and Sikkink (1998) focuses on 
transnational advocacy networks to address the relationships among actors and the 
distribution of material capabilities of international policy-making (Danish 2008:217). 
Advocacy networks are those centered on values and principled ideas and aim to reach 
institutional and principles change rather than just policy change (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:2). Transnational advocacy networks aim to influence political outcomes through 
efforts of persuasion, socialization and pressure. In this sense, advocacy networks carry 
out political campaigns, choosing different strategies to persuade policy or behavior 
change by another actor. In order to address how environmental advocacy networks 
establish transnational institutions, this paper focuses on the campaign by the 
environmental advocacy network. Networks use campaigns – sets of linked activities in 
which members develop explicit ties and roles as steering mechanisms – to achieve their 
goals. This should be understood as the process of constructing a problem and 
proposing a solution (Keck and Sikkink 1998:6-8) and a mechanism of governance. 
This paper builds on the fourfold typology developed by Keck and Sikkink 
(1998) to analyze the tactics used by NSAs in their efforts to influence global 
environmental governance. Firstly, environmental advocacy networks can use 
information politics. This tactic regards the use of information as leverage, not only by 
decreasing uncertainty of international negotiations when reporting facts, but also by 
using testimonies and information exchange to persuade action and change. Generation 
of alternate and reliable information is one of the most important functions of networks 
for binding the network together and broadening NSAs’ legitimacy (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:19-21). 
Secondly, symbolic politics consists of framing issues through explanation 
of emblematic events in order to persuade other actors’ behavior. At this point, framing 
contends the strategic efforts by NSAs to set up shared interpretations and values that 
legitimize and motivate collective action (Keck and Sikkink 1998:23). An effective 
frame stresses an issue, pointing out the responsible parties and activities, and then 
proposes a plausible solution. Symbolic technique is, hence, a mechanism to create 
meaningfulness and awareness about an issue in order to mobilize concern and find the 
favorable institutional venue for policy change (Keck and Sikkink 1998:3). 
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Leverage politics, the third tactic, refers to pressuring and persuading 
powerful actors when other networks’ members are unlikely to directly influence 
policy-making processes. In this case, advocacy networks will foster behavioral change 
by means of either material or moral leverage. While the former relates to monetary 
aspects, including goods and tangible benefits, the latter grasps reputational and 
credibility matters. Moral leverage involves mobilization of shame (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:23), which contends with exposing violations of international obligations in order 
to weaken powerful actors’ support in lower constituencies (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:23). 
Lastly, accountability politics is the set of strategies to make regime 
compliance persuasive in the long term. To put it differently, it is the political effort “to 
hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles” (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:16). This tactic is to hold actors accountable for violating compromises and 
positions under international regimes. Therefore, accountability politics intends to 
expose the distance between discourse and practice (Keck and Sikkink 1998:16). 
This typology is connected to this research, because it sheds light on the 
process and strategies employed by NSAs to influence international political outcomes. 
However, this typology alone tells too little about the effect of the influence. The 
implementation depends on the influence the network has on international outcomes to 
be effective. As Bulkeley et al. explain “how we might conceptualize the effectiveness 
of transnational governance is similarly derived from a concern with the functional 
requirements and interests of the actors involved” (2009:46). Thus, effectiveness is 
conceived in terms of realization of the actors’ objective. As the Monsanto Tribunal is 
yet to convene and the campaign is far for being over, it is not possible to assess the 
effectiveness of the campaign. However, this paper addresses some points on 
effectiveness to clarify and make prospect about the impact of the campaign. 
International Monsanto Tribunal 
The International Monsanto Tribunal is an initiative of environmental 
advocacy networks to set up a court, which will assess and bring out allegations of 
breach of international law and environmental and health damage against Monsanto, a 
US-based company. Put differently, this Tribunal is a social institution, whose main 
goal is to change the current model of global environmental governance, especially 
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concerning the balance between socio-environmental rights and the agricultural 
paradigm. Even though this network is establishing a tribunal, they do not expect an 
enforceable decision. In this vein, Ronnie Cummins, one of the members of the 
organizing committee, says “[p]eople will be putting Monsanto on trial in the court of 
public opinion” (Senapathy In: Forbes 2015). 
The primary activity is to set up an international tribunal, which will 
convene on the 14
th
 and 16
th
 of October 2016 in The Hague. There will be two 
simultaneous events, a formal tribunal and peoples’ assembly. The formal tribunal, on 
the one hand, aims to get a ruling, by highly recognized judges, following “veritable 
proceedings in an international court, and contribute to the establishment of 
international mechanisms to bring justice to victims of multinationals” (Monsanto 
Tribunal). Veritable proceedings relates to principles and customary laws of procedure, 
including, but not limited to the adversarial system and the due process of law – widely 
adopted by lawmakers. The proceedings are similar to the institution of legal opinions 
of other international tribunals, such as advisory proceedings at the International Court 
of Justice. The proceedings include hearings and testimonials from witnesses and 
victims of Monsanto activities, such as Colombian and Indian farmers, as well as pleas 
from attorneys. Monsanto has not recognized the Tribunal and have therefore not 
provided legal representation
1
. There will be between five to nine judges, whose names 
are yet to be disclosed. However, what is known at this time is that the judges shall be 
prominent international jurists (e.g. law professionals, former judges). The 
environmental advocacy network’s legal team drafted six questions (Terms of 
Reference) that will be posed to the nominated judges. Most of the questions rely not 
only on the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights of the United Nation 
(UN), but also on positive rights recognized by other international legal instruments, 
such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the war 
crime provision of the Rome Statute. In addition, there is a key question to assess the 
conduct of Monsanto as regards the crime of ecocide, which will lead to the 
examination of whether the Rome Statute should be amended in order to include 
ecocide as the fifth crime against humanity. The judges shall issue an advisory opinion 
on each of the six questions, meaning that they will have no direct enforceability against 
Monsanto. These advisory opinions will help to provide a better understanding of the 
                                                            
1 It is yet to be decided if the network will appoint an attorney to represent Monsanto or not. Monsanto 
has not replied my interview requests. 
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applicable laws and regime under which transnational corporations operates, especially 
with regard to socio-environmental protection. As specific objectives, the advocacy 
network expect that these rulings assess the actions and damages caused pursuant to 
international law; they aim to put Monsanto’s activities in perspective in relation to the 
Rome Statute in order to assess the possibility of the institutionalization of ecocide. 
The peoples’ assembly, on the other hand, is an event aimed at the 
overarching network, where activists, NGOs and other civil society members will 
gather. This event will serve as a meeting point for information exchange and 
workshops to raise awareness of the issues. Different society groups can present their 
projects and campaigns and increase their support, strengthening the network’s links 
and actors. Additionally, the International Monsanto Tribunal’s organizers intend to live 
stream the formal tribunal for those who cannot afford to attend the event. In order to 
reflect the international aspect of the event, local organizations and supporters might 
stage local events, such as marches or social gatherings, to draw attention to the issues 
worldwide. 
The International Monsanto Tribunal specifies five ways in which it expects 
to impact global environmental governance: (i) to raise awareness of the dangers of 
industrial and chemical agriculture and the need a shift in agricultural paradigm, by 
providing public opinion and policy makers with heightened understanding of 
Monsanto’s practices and their impact on the environment and human rights; (ii) 
contribute to the ongoing debate on what it means to hold a company responsible for 
violating fundamental rights; (iii) provide victims and their legal counsel the arguments 
and legal grounds for further lawsuits against Monsanto within their national 
jurisdictions; (iv) highlight the need to change international law so that victims of 
transnational companies have a means to legal redress; and (v) evidence why the crime 
of ecocide must be recognized under international law. 
Advocacy Network 
The following subsections depict the environmental advocacy network 
linked to the Monsanto Tribunal and, the campaign carried out to establish it. Firstly, 
the network itself and the actors involved in it are described, with emphasis on problem-
solving capacities and attributes of legitimacy (reliability, impartiality, accountability 
and representativeness). Subsequently, I analyze the campaign, for it “provides a 
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window to transnational relations as an arena of struggle in ways that focus on networks 
themselves or on the institutions they try to affect does not” (Keck and Sikkink 1998:7). 
The tactics framework, set out in the previous section, is used to evaluate the stages of 
the process of institutionalization. Then, some lessons are drawn regarding 
effectiveness. 
Actors from civil society – individuals, NGOs, social movements, 
enterprises and political parties – who either support or indirectly participate in one the 
events comprise the overarching International Monsanto Tribunal network. The number 
of members, reach, and interactions, all help to identify if a network is dense and strong 
or unsteady and weak (Pattberg and Stripple 2007:6; Keck and Sikkink 1999:200). The 
network consists of with more than five thousand individuals and two hundred 
organizations and social movements transnationally. These supporters are “invited to 
participate in outreach and awareness raising activities in their respective countries and 
citizen mobilization” (Monsanto Tribunal) and to attend and be active in the people’s 
assembly. Membership is granted to those who sign the online petition. This easy access 
to membership has two consequences. Firstly, the linkage among members is not 
necessarily strong, to the extent that supporters may not interact and exchange 
information so much. However, there is a coalition of key actors that work more closely 
and directly toward the institutionalization process. This coalition, which can be viewed 
essentially as being the members of the steering committee, coordinates strategies and 
its linkage to the campaign are tighter, for they maintain a more formal level of contact 
to strategize the campaign (Khagram et. al. 2002:7). Secondly, this ease of membership 
broadens the reach of the network and spreads the joint discourse on changing 
governance.  
Moreover, the members of the coalition of key actors are professionals with 
different backgrounds with expertise in relation to the issues to be addressed by the 
Tribunal. These are representatives of civil society with relevant expertise in different 
issue areas, such as international law, politics of activism, research and the agrarian and 
food industries. To illustrate this point, some key members of the steering committee 
their expertise in relation to environmental governance are introduced. There are 
international lawyers and jurists, such as Dr. Olivier De Schutter, who is co-chair of the 
International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems and member of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Corinne Lepage, who is not only a 
 Page 14 of 25 
lawyer, but also former French environment minister and honorary President of the 
Independent Committee for Research and Information on Genetic Engineering 
(CRIIGEN); and Valerie Cabanes, spokesperson for the world citizen movement – End 
Ecocide on Earth. Beyond international law area, the activist Dr. Vandana Shiva, who 
Forbes magazine in November 2010 identified as one of the top Seven most Powerful 
Women on the Globe and initiator of several social movement, bestows support to the 
campaign with networking knowledge. Lastly, the Tribunal is supported by Marie-
Monique Robin, journalist, filmmaker and author best-selling documentary “The World 
to According Monsanto”. She is the patron of the tribunal and intends to film a 
documentary covering the Tribunal. 
Other studies suggest that citizen science provides the necessary tools and 
expertise to engage in complex problem solving, having great potential for mobilization 
(Johnson et al. 2014; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram et. al 2002). It is true that 
having different expertise of the members is relevant to the network’s problem-solving 
capacity, especially in view of the complexity of global environmental policy-making, 
but further research is needed to investigate the circumstances under which this actually 
enhances the networks’ problem-solving capacity (Börzel and Risse 2002:2). 
The expertise and knowledge explained above also matters to the advocacy 
network’s moral authority, to the extent that quality information provided by the actors 
improves its global governance legitimacy. Reliability and veracity of information 
impact on the transnational network’s moral authority, for it provides information about 
global governance and assumes a more global perspective. Much of reliability can be 
related to the reputation and credibility of the coalition actors not only as providers of 
objective expertise, but also as neutral third parties whose information can be trusted 
(Price 2003:315). As to assuming a global perspective, the advocacy network is 
expected to propose alternative solutions, in which all voices are taken into account. 
The coalition of the International Monsanto Tribunal, as seen above, counts with 
experts and researchers from different backgrounds, including students from the 
University of Louvain (Belgium), Yale University (United States) and the University of 
Bordeaux (France). Moreover, the advocacy network consists of several grassroots 
movements that work alongside experts and researchers in a horizontal relationship 
within the network. This entails a bottom-top approach to policy-making, where the 
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new rules and norms are institutionalized considering the in-put of those who are 
affected by governance, and thus being perceived as legitimate. 
In the analysis of the next attribute, impartiality, the network’s actors “need 
to be seen as not personally interested in acquiring political and economic power, or as 
too linked to government and industry” (Khagram et al. 2002:313) for the networks to 
claim their moral authority. Governance legitimacy can, thus, be improved based on the 
independence of actors in pursuing a shared goal. Impartiality implies that the decision-
making process serves the common good and conforms to criteria of distributive justice 
(Börzel and Risse 2002:13). Evidence suggests that the International Monsanto Tribunal 
network has no economic interest, nor a political agenda to gain power for selfish 
reasons. It is true that there is crowd funding initiative to fund the Tribunal's budget, 
which is estimated at half a million euros. However, the money is destined to logistical 
activities only, such as venue rental, for both the formal tribunal and the people’s 
assembly, and transportation and accommodation for selected witnesses who cannot 
afford to go to the Netherlands. By relying upon civil society donations only, the 
advocacy network is likely to be impartial and to avoid bias towards other governance 
players. Equally important is the fact that all the network’s actors are participating 
voluntarily without monetary compensation. This means more autonomy for the actors 
and their strategies (Wapner 1995, 144).  
Furthermore, financial issues also influence on the claim of moral authority 
in terms of accountability and transparency. This does not mean, however, that 
accountability and transparency relate only to financial matters. The network under 
analysis has good transparency policies, providing enough information about its 
composition and activities, especially through their website, and their internal decision-
making process. Additionally, they have open communication with the public, being 
responsive on social media. As to financial matters, the network is committed “to 
transparent, ethical and exemplary governance, the Steering Committee will exercise its 
utmost vigilance to ensure the proper use of money given to the Foundation” (Monsanto 
Tribunal).  
The last attribute for improving environmental global governance 
legitimacy is representativeness. Indeed, as argued, previously, representativeness is 
more than an attribute, it is an underlying assumption of governance legitimacy, 
‘conditio sine qua non’ for an advocacy network possesses all other three attributes. If 
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networks are to multiply the channels of influence on global governance, it has to 
advance shared values and motivate interested constituencies. Thus, representativeness 
also entails not deviating its constituencies (other actors) common interests. In this 
fashion, the active participation of voices from different actors in the internal decision-
making process also counts. However, representativeness is not limited to reproduce the 
preferences of the network’ supporters, it also means shaping their identities and 
behavior (Murphy 2007:44). 
Campaign 
To recap, campaigns are sets of collective activities that transnational 
advocacy networks develop in order to institutionalize policy-coordination mechanisms. 
These political activities are the network’s efforts of persuasion, socialization and 
pressure to achieve their goal. As explained earlier, the International Monsanto 
Tribunal’s goal is to change the current model of global environmental governance, but 
this is not a straightforward goal, as there are many levels in which change can happen. 
That is the reason for employing different strategies, with specific and assertive goals. 
The main strategies of the International Monsanto Tribunal are highlighted below under 
the tactics framework. 
Information politics 
The International Monsanto Tribunal intends to generate alternate and reliable 
information in order to increase the amount of information available and, thus, influence 
change in current global environmental policies. To this end, the main strategy is to 
gather a collection of case files and substantial research related to environmental 
regulation and international law, and drafting legal briefs that will be used at the event 
and made available to the public afterwards. Hence, the International Monsanto 
Tribunal advocacy network will “provide information that would not otherwise be 
available, from sources that might not otherwise be heard, and they must make this 
information comprehensible and useful to activists and publics who may be 
geographically and/or socially distant” (1998:18). 
To provide credible information to other members of the network entails 
strengthening its relations and empowering its constituencies. This is essential for 
network effectiveness, for it stimulates people to act (Keck and Sikkink 1998:18). A 
reliable advocacy network produces credible information when it produces well-
documented evidence to either frame an issue or call attention to it. In this fashion, in 
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addition to the legal case files, the International Monsanto Tribunal has established 
working groups that will study and assess the impact of agribusiness companies in 
relation to six academic areas, namely, the right to a healthy environment; the right to 
health; the right to food; freedom of expression and academic research; complicity in 
war crimes and, finally, ecocide. The aim of these working groups is to highlight the 
broader discussion of responsibility (or accountability) of transnational companies 
violating human rights. The campaign is gathering essential information that is 
dispersed worldwide and distribute to network members, broadening their legitimacy as 
players and as fits their aim, raising “awareness of the dangers of industrial and 
chemical agriculture and the need for a shift in the agricultural paradigm” (Monsanto 
Tribunal). 
Another important aspect of information politics is that the media is a valuable 
partner to provide broad audience and “to gain attention, the information must be timely 
and dramatic” (Keck and Sikkink 1998:19). However, it is hard to grasp what timely 
action would be, considering that the campaign is thought about in the long-term. When 
it comes to information politics, timely information is that which is provided at the best 
possible moment, that is, when it can reach the most people. The International 
Monsanto Tribunal will convene on October 16, coinciding with World Food Day, the 
annual celebration of the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
This year’s global message for World Food Day is “Climate is changing. Food and 
agriculture must too.” (World Food Day 2016) It calls upon states to include food and 
agriculture in their climate action plans and to invest more in rural development. The 
Tribunal is not officially linked to FAO, nor World Food day, but choosing the same 
day is an example of timely action in information politics. Reinforcing debates around 
the same issue helps raise awareness and bring different perspectives, and provides an 
inclusive arena where like-minded and opposing groups inform their discussion. The 
advocacy network expects that “public opinion and policy makers will gain heightened 
understanding of Monsanto’s practices and their impact on the environment and human 
rights.” (Monsanto Tribunal). 
Furthermore, transnational advocacy networks use testimonies in order to reach 
a broader audience and get media media’s attention. Testimonies are “the stories told by 
people whose lives have been affected” (Keck and Sikkink 1999:95). Testimonies are a 
persuasive device for it helps more people to relate to share principles has more impact 
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than technical and specific values. In the case at point, these testimonies concerns the 
twenty plaintiffs from all continents, their cases and hearings, that will be analyzed and 
interpreted along with technical and legal reviews. In addition to those, the advocacy 
network is accepting submissions of testimonies worldwide. They will identify key 
cases that be used during the people’s assembly event. Moreover, Keck and Sikkink 
explain that “an important part of the political struggle over information is whether an 
issue is defined primarily as technical, subject to consideration by ‘qualified’ experts, or 
as something that concerns a much broader global constituency” (1999:96). The 
International Monsanto Tribunal cope with this struggle, since the information is 
actually technical of international law, but because of its replicability (cases covers all 
continents) and how they translate to other cases, they manage to also make it 
interesting in global terms. 
Symbolic politics 
Recall that this tactic consists of framing issues through explanation of 
emblematic events, fostering awareness and catalysts for the growth of networks (Keck 
and Sikkink 1999:96). The International Monsanto Tribunal is framing an issue around 
environmental governance of transnational corporations, while indicating responsible 
parties and activities, and with the court’s decision, they will also have an alternative 
solution to the problem. The advocacy network claims that its general purpose is to get 
a ruling, even symbolic, against Monsanto. The Tribunal itself is a demonstration of 
symbolic politics. This tactic is part of the long-term persuasion efforts to change global 
environmental governance, especially with regard to impunity of transnational 
corporations. Indeed, the Tribunal advocacy network claims that “Monsanto will serve 
as an example for the entire agro-industrial system whereby putting on trial all 
multinationals and companies that employ entrepreneurial behavior that ignore the 
damage wrecked on health and the environment by their actions” (Monsanto Tribunal). 
Leverage politics 
This tactic refers to pressuring and persuading powerful actors, usually 
considered states and international organizations, by either material or moral leverage. I 
argue, on the one hand, that the Monsanto Tribunal does not provide any tactics 
regarding material leverage, due to the absence of monetary issues and issue-linkage 
with other governance actors. On the other hand, the International Monsanto Tribunal 
exerts persuasion through mobilization of shame, which contends with exposing 
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violations of international obligations in order to weaken powerful actors’ support in 
lower constituencies (Keck and Sikkink 1998:23). It attacks Monsanto’s credibility by 
putting it under public scrutiny and mobilizing solidarity among the advocacy network’s 
members. Similarly, the media attention surrounding this issue serves as moral leverage. 
Accountability politics 
The International Monsanto Tribunal has no evident accountability politics. 
In order to develop accountability politics, other actors would have to change discursive 
positions, so that the advocacy network could use this new discourse to hold the other 
actor accountable. However, in this case, there is no window of opportunity for the 
network, at least until the Tribunal convene – when other actors may change their 
discourse positions. 
Effectiveness 
Effectiveness is a paramount concept in this paper and yet difficult to grasp, 
even harder to assess. In this regard, Pattberg explains “in simple terms, the judgement 
‘something is effective/has influence’ refers to the situation that some organization, 
policy or institution is performing some generic function that can be assessed against 
some point of reference involving some metric of measurement” (2005:4). Due to time 
constraints, this paper lacks a point of reference to analyze the impact of the campaign 
on global environmental governance. Notwithstanding the absence of policy-change so 
far, this paper addresses issue and the network’s actors characteristics under which 
advocacy network are likely to be effective. 
Keck and Sikkink (1999:98) argue that networks’ campaigns on issues 
involving individuals/innocents physically harmed, especially when the causal relation 
is well evidenced have a better chance to be successful. The International Monsanto 
Tribunal establishes a clear and concise connection between the harm and Monsanto’s 
activities and they will use testimonies of individual directly affected, creating an 
effective frame. Moreover, the ability to achieve policy-change is linked to a network 
strength and density (Keck and Sikkink 1999:98). As addressed previously, the 
International Monsanto Tribunal is dense and strong, particularly its steering committee, 
and capable of framing debates and setting transnational agenda. 
The International Monsanto Tribunal fits well both frameworks set out in 
this paper. Even though the campaign lack accountability politics, it can still be 
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effective since advocacy can combine the different strategies as and when they will. 
What matters is that the campaign institutionalized a policy-coordination mechanisms 
and influences in environmental politics 
Conclusions 
This paper provides a theoretically grounded empirical analysis of the 
process of institutionalization that establishes a private mechanism of global 
environmental governance. Civil society multiplies the channels of influence in 
decision-making processes. This influence however, does not occur due to coercive 
power, rather transnational mechanisms of governance are based on persuasion efforts 
of transnational networks translated in the campaigns. This paper investigated these 
efforts guided by a theoretical framework embedded in transnationalism, which assumes 
a multi-level and polycentric web of governance with diverse authorities and 
mechanisms. 
In this scenario, the International Monsanto Tribunal is an unprecedented 
campaign to establish a private international tribunal. The Tribunal combines strategies 
and initiatives to address flaws of the environmental regime without coercive power. 
Since the campaign is still happening, this paper does not analyze the conditions of 
effectiveness of the campaign, rather it focuses on attributes of the transnational 
advocacy network and the tactics employed by them. I argue that the Tribunal fits the 
frameworks highlighted, suggesting that the campaign has good probability of 
impacting global environmental governance. However, I make space for future research 
to investigate the efforts and its relation to effectiveness of regime. 
Certainly, there will be more discussion not only about the Monsanto 
Tribunal, but also about the role of civil society in governance matters. It is necessary to 
further our knowledge and question the possibility of effective and legitimate 
governance, accounting for an increasing number of actors and several institutional 
contexts. Lastly, this paper draws on political science scholarship, because this 
discipline recognizes that no matter how institutionalized rule systems may be, 
governance is not a constant concept. However, this subject also needs to be addressed 
by international law due to its implications for transnational legal processes. My hope is 
that this article provides valuable material about institution building to advance the 
matter into normative research and other holistic approaches.  
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